Category: Deals Page 4 of 6

LiveWire in the Groove

LiveWire Mobile (part of Nasdaq-listed NMS Communications Corp) acquired former ringtone and now full-track platform provider Groove Mobile for $14.5m in what commentators call an “unexpected swoop” (why? because they waited with the PR until the deal was closed?).

Groove Mobile runs the music decks for 12 carriers, including most notably Sprint in the US and 3 UK. It also holds contracts with all major music labels.

Now, why should this be unexpected? The press release lays out the “strategic reasons” for the acquisition and, whilst it is all a bit embellished in the usual PR blurp, it is relatively plain to see: LiveWire Mobile are – or so I understand – specialising in ringback services (their website says they are deployed on 30 carriers with that). However, those carriers do not seem to give them too big a footprint: the release states that the acquisition triples their “addressable market”.

Also, ringbacks are a bit of a beast to run as they require deep integration with the carrier on which it is deployed (you need to be on network level to integrate this), and the relationships of a company that runs the music platforms for some carriers are naturally quite valuable to someone like that (although someone still needs to explain to me what turn-key means in mobile telecommunications terms). So: you get someone who is already integrated with a carrier, you increase your chances that that carrier will choose more services from you. Compelling, huh?

If it is a good acquisition remains to be seen: ringbacks are utter flops in some countries (people query the value of a service that the person paying for it never experiences…) and huge hits in others; not consistent though… Also, digital music distribution seems to be a field with utterly low margins; great if you can deliver VERY efficiently and to enough consumers but tough as you always face margin pressure from every side you are involved with: the labels that are struggling to replace retail sales and the carriers (and, increasingly web players and OEM) who want to be amply “reimbursed” for allowing you to sell to their customers. If the above considerations can deliver, it should have been a good buy: at about 2 x revenues, it was at a relatively sane valuation multiple.

Good luck, folks!

Super-Glu!?

It is the conference season, so I am falling a little behind but this is one that needs to be recorded here: The good folks from Glu announced that they would acquire AIM-listed 3D games specialist Superscape for $36 million (which however includes $11m in cash Superscape is still having in its savings account). On $7.2m revenue for the 6 months ending July 2007, this would equate to a revenue multiple of c. 1.7 (based on flat sales and a purchase price from which the cash at hand is deducted) which should be substantially higher than Glu’s c. 0.6 (awaiting the announcement of their 2007 results).

Glu has been hit brutally following their announcement of their Q3 results, falling from somewhere around $10.40 per share to $4.19 tonight based on worse than expected growth and earnings. They had recently announced expansion into China – a market with numbing growth numbers but also hard commercial parameters – through the up to $40m acquisition of MIG, which however failed to help their share price.

Now, Superscape adds market share in more familiar pastures, namely in the US where 98.4% of its revenue are generated, and this may well have been the main reason for the buy: it will cement Glu’s position in this key market. I am however not sure if there is more to this deal than that because the remaining parameters of Superscape do not look too good: the company focussed on the niche 3D sector, which did not fly as predicted (or should one say demanded) by the carriers. It is loss-making (and has been for a while if not forever). It grows less than Glu (as remarked by an analyst (report courtesy of MoCoNews).

Even if the deal rationale was synergies (reducing headcount as all they would really need from Superscape is their Moscow development facilities [which are a rather impressive operation as I could learn a few years back during a visit] and shut down their US and possibly UK offices), one would have to ask if this was the right deal. Superscape lost more than $2.8m on $7.2m revenue, so it is rather questionable if they could swing this into profitability quickly. I would posit that Glu would be rather capable of fighting for revenue and market share if it would not have to look at cost (their roster of titles is pretty impressive and they have been on an aggressive growth path), so would they not have been better advised to look for a profit-boosting acquisition as this seems to be their Achilles heel? Prove me wrong, Greg, please!

Handmark gets its hands on Astraware

One is a leading content provider for the niche smartphone market, the other a leading games developer for the niche smartphone market (Palm, Windows Mobile, Blackberry, etc), now they will become the leading content publisher for the niche but quickly growing smartphone market. Enter the reported acquisition of Astraware by Handmark.

Handmark publishes smartphone versions of e.g. Tetris and Scrabble and also runs the Pocket Express mobile news service. Astraware does the same for Bejewelled, Zuma and Chuzzle but also has a sizable portfolio of generic games and applications. They also have their coding hands in iPod games. As a lot of high-end smartphone stuff is retailed through shops where Handmark has a decent footprint, the two should improve margins on Astraware titles immediately. Presumably their distribution footprints for the remainder (e.g. is Astraware a Microsoft Gold Partner and embeds lots on Windows Mobile devices) also provide for some synergies.

Unfortunately nothing was reported on deal terms but, on the merits, this makes sense. Good luck, guys!

Vodafone walks through the Ovi with Nokia

Following their relatively recent announcement of a multimedia initiative, Nokia reports a big win with Vodafone having agreed to carry their Ovi platform on Nokia devices that are distributed through the operator. Ovi, which is Finnish for door, was to be Nokia’s next big push towards becoming a multimedia company. One of its flagships under that umbrella, the Nokia Music Store, will now run alongside Vodafone’s own music service.

Nokia’s risk with the introduction of Ovi was that operators would reject having the Ovi links on the phones that they were distributing (not uncommon for them to do), so to have the “world’s largest operator by revenue” amongst their ranks is no small feat. Otherwise, Nokia would have seen limited distribution in markets where handset prices are subsidised by carriers, which is true in most!

With Nokia having bolstered its portfolio of offerings in recent months even more (the acquisition of Navteq being the biggest one), this opens the pipeline to a much richer content experience, and this is what might have pursuaded the good folks at Vodafone: with carriers struggling to come to terms on the “right” treatment of content to maximise sales and user experience, a door to a fully-packed store of content and applications must sound tempting.

It might actually mark a turn in the market: could it become the handset manufacturers who will take the lead in the content space and become the funnel through which content providers feed their wares to the consumer? It would make sense in that it is arguably easier for an OEM to ensure that there is optimal performance for a product on a device (after all, they manufacture the device). Such a model would bring relief to the operators who would continue to control the billing relationship with the consumer and hence alleviate fears of removing that bond but they would be a big step closer to becoming the dreaded bit pipe as had happened to ISP on the Internet. I have argued before that this process would – in any event – take longer, so that might alleviate fears.

It is breaking into the control-driven model of operators, and that is a significant development in itself. Nothing will of course change for the content providers, at least not in the short term: it is just that they need to ring a different doorbell now (or rather an additional one…).

Motricity acquires Infospace mobile assets

Now, this is a big deal: Motricity puts $135m in cash onto the table of the under-pressure Infospace people to acquire the remains of the Infospace mobile business, including search, storefronts, portals and messaging. The deal was financed by existing investors Carl Icahn and VC Advanced Equities (see reporting from MoCoNews here and here).

The acquisition marks the end of an odyssey into mobile by Inforspace, in which it first acquired and then effectively destroyed some of the brightest stars on the mobile content sky, including game developers Atlas (bought for $6m, sold for $1.5m), Elkware (bought for some $26m and then closed) and IOMO (bought for $15m, then closed in August 2007) as well as ringtone giants Moviso. They lost people, money and ultimately the businesses (e.g. IOMO’s founders have recently opened their new shop, Finblade). What a battlefield…

Motricity’s, so far predominantly a platform and storefront provider, entrant into the increasingly competitive content publishing space comes at a time where more and more players try to extend their reach on the value chain: one sees platform providers expanding into master content provider relationships, one sees publishers (e.g. Player X) seizing the same position, and all are in a quest to concentrate enough revenue and margin in order to be able to run a profitable business in an environment where still the majority of players are losing money.

The challenge for Motricity will be to grow its business outside the US, and this is arguably where the risks are hiddedn. In the US, the company claims to have now grown their distribution footprint to 11 of “top 13” North American carriers (which leave another 10 that are apparently not top), which however seems OK since they add two of the biggies which they couldn’t reach before, namely mighty Verizon and AT&T (I still prefer the name Cingular!). The gamble is arguably being mitigated by the presumed synergies through the search, portal and messaging business, and this is where I suspect the balance of risk lies in respect of the financial considerations: because it harnesses Motricity’s existing business, the venture into the publishing side of things appears somewhat less risky. All in all, a deal that might just make sense; if the money is adequate? Who could say? What proportion of growth will come through which part of the business? Hmmm. There have been deals that, on the face of it, looked more reckless in the past (remember the seemingly atrocious $145m Jamdat paid for Blue Lava [incl. $8m non-breakup fee to Tetris, LLC])? It paid off for them as then EA bought them for a rather sweet $680m. I would not suggest that the same will happen to Motricity although, looking at the monies invested into them to date, it will just about have to be the exit its investors are looking to.

Nokia maps it out, buys Navteq

Nice thing if you can get it: for a modest $8.1 bn ($7.7 bn if you discount the cash the company has in its coffers), Nokia acquired the provider of digital maps, Navteq. Even though this marks Nokia’s largest acquisition ever, it is a hardly surprising move given the recent activities of the company to flex its muscles in the content space. Its Nokia Maps application cried out for something like that (it ran on Navteq-supplied maps anyhow). To combine GPS-equipped phones with the people who power loads of todays digital maps seems smart, in particular when one fairly apparent new competitor in Nokia’s courtyard runs a fairly successful digital mapping solution itself, namely Google: If the proprietor of Google Maps enters the handset market with the already somewhat fabled GPhone (another article here), Nokia is arming itself to withhold and defend its still impressive market share of c 1/3 of the global market for mobile handsets, errh, multimedia devices. Last year’s acquisition of Gate5 seems to not have been enough for that. No other big OEM has come out with GPS-enabled devices with force yet, so Nokia’s move would also cement its positions amongst its current peers.

So what will we see? Easy, huh? After turning mobile phones in multimedia computers and slashing away on the digital camera and music player market along the way, navigation systems (or “sat nav” as your ubiquitous salesman affectionately calls it) will apparently be the next victim: who needs them if one has a GPS-equipped Nokia N95 (which, yes, also comes with a digital camera powered by a prestigious Carl Zeiss lense and has 8GB space to accommodate your music and videos).

This is the near-sighted and easy bit and I am all for it: if I can have the quality of specialist devices merged into one, then that is my device of choice even though the challenge is that you then have to beat every leader in the segment. But the history of camera and music phones shows that there is a niche that is rather a gaping cleft, in particular when also cleverly branded, and one that is apparently growing. So why not for sat nav, too?

The magic word however is context-awareness. It can probably be called the holy grail of service and product discovery and the provision of relevant offers: if I am being offered something in a context that makes the offer relevant, I am much more likely to be lured into using/buying it. This is exactly how Google’s famed AdSense works (and advertising is an area Nokia recently focussed on, too, i.e. with the acquisition of Enpocket).

The principle of context increasing relevance naturally applies to everything: if I am hungry, I am more likely to visit a restaurant. If I am at an airport, I am more likely to be interested in flight times, or travel offers, etc, etc. So combining a device that adds an important context parameter, namely location with a platform like Nokia’s Ovi that adds an array of different services (games, music, maps, etc) looks like a model that should increase the likelihood of a purchase – because it can offer the user a more relevant offering in the context in which he uses the device. Nokia seems to be finding it easier to get its content-loaded multimedia devices past the carriers’ doors, too, that is if Graeme Ferguson, ex-Vodafone Content Meister, is to be believed

However, I will continue to call it a mobile phone…

Nokia pockets Enpocket

Nokia has agreed to buy ad-platform provider Enpocket for an undisclosed sum. The deal is expected to close later this year. This, coupled with Nokia’s recent announcements concerning Ovi, shows the Finnish giant’s push into other parts of the mobile content value chain.

Nokia’s CTO Tero Ojanperä highlighted just that: “Nokia has already announced its intention to be a leading company in consumer Internet services and we believe that mobile advertising will be an important element in monetizing those services for our customers and partners. […] This acquisition is a […] move to bring the reach and depth of Nokia to organize the market across the world, and make it easier for an ecosystem to develop.”

Nothing much to add, I guess. It’ll be interesting if they will manage to leverage Nokia’s might to extend the reach of Enpocket or if the latter will simply be absorbed by the sheer size of the former…

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